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Abstract 
This study investigates the nature and extent of compliance to the principle-based corporate 
governance initiatives by the listed companies in the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) in 
Fiji. Three important questions are addressed: (i) whether listed companies in Fiji have 
complied with the principle-based governance practices: (ii) did compliance with principle-
based recommendations lead to an improvement in the listed company‟s financial 
performance? and (iii) how the institutional factors have contributed towards corporate 
governance practices in Fiji? 
Panel data for the SPSE companies over the period 2008-2010 are analysed using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression. Tobin‟s Q, Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) 
and Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation to Total Revenue 
(EBITDA2REV) metrics are used as dependent variables. Findings indicate that listed 
companies have adopted the Capital Market Development Authority‟s (CMDA) 
recommendations, establishing subcommittees for audit and remuneration, and having non-
executive/independent directors on the board. The result supports the view that the CMDA 
recommendations of board sub-committees (Audit and Remuneration) have had positive 
influence on company performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. The findings of this study give 
support to the principle-based corporate governance practices adopted in Fiji.  The results of 
this study provide useful insights to both regulators and policy analysts (in Fiji and 
internationally) seeking to enhance both governance and firm performance in their own 
jurisdiction.   
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Keywords: Corporate governance, Institutional theory, Board of directors, Managerial 
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Corporate Governance Practices in Fiji: An Empirical Investigation 
 
1 Introduction 
Large corporate failures at the beginning of the 21st century in Europe and America and the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 have highlighted the importance of investor protection and 
good corporate governance practices.  The corporate governance system refers to one of the 
means by which a nation channels corporate power for the good of society so that wealth is 
created efficiently and distributed fairly within a national economy (Monks, 2007). The 
financial crisis of 2007–2009  have also been attributed to the failures and weaknesses in 
corporate governance practices (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  Some argue that boards‟ lack of 
monitoring and lack of understanding of the nature and impact of risks undertaken has caused 
the financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009), while others argue that it is the result of the lack of 
shareholder monitoring  (Icahn, 2009). However, the widespread concern is  how boards and 
shareholders could let this happen and more specifically, why did the corporate governance 
system failed so massively. 
As a consequence, the effectiveness of self-regulation has been increasingly questioned by 
both the academia as well as, markets and regulators (Bianchi, Ciavarella, Novembre, & 
Signoretti, 2010). The principle-based corporate governance guidelines have been adopted by 
a number of jurisdictions in both developed and emerging capital markets with a view to 
improve investor confidence. The principle-based corporate governance guidelines are a 
voluntary recommendation for good governance where listed companies are required to 
clearly state the reasons for non-compliance. The South Pacific Stock Exchange (hereafter 
SPSE) also adopted the principle-based corporate governance code in 2009 with a view to 
enhance investor participation and confidence in the capital market in Fiji. The SPSE listing 
rules Section 6.42 require all listed companies to comply with the corporate governance code 
as stipulated under the Reserve Bank of Fiji (hereafter RBF) corporate governance principles 
and reporting guidelines (SPSE, 2010). Given that Fiji has small size and small number of 
companies listed compared to other capital markets, it was believed that the flexibility 
provided by the principle-based approach will minimise compliance costs, as well as, 
encourage companies to adopt the spirit of the principles/code. The principle-based approach 
is a purely voluntary measure which requires companies to either „comply‟ with the set 
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guidelines or „explain‟ if deviating from those set guidelines. Therefore, it was assumed that 
the „comply or explain‟ approach would ultimately lead to improved corporate governance 
practices in Fiji. 
However, relatively scarce literature exists on the nature of compliance of listed companies to 
the corporate governance principles in Fiji. Also, little is known about the impact compliance 
to the corporate governance code has had on financial performance of companies listed in the 
SPSE. If the companies that did comply with the corporate governance code but did not 
improve financial performance, then the motivation for the shareholders‟ to remain 
committed to voluntary recommendations becomes questionable.  
This study investigates the nature and extent of compliance to the principal-based corporate 
governance initiatives by the listed companies in the South Pacific Stock Exchange in Fiji.  
This study attempts to address three important questions: (1) what is the extent to which 
listed companies in Fiji have complied with the principal-based recommendations; (2) did 
compliance with principal-based recommendations lead to an improvement in the listed 
company‟s financial performance?; and (3) how the institutional factors have contributed 
towards governance practices in Fiji and in particular, to the companies listed in the SPSE. 
2 Background 
The Suva Stock Exchange was established in 1979 as a subsidiary of the Fiji Development 
Bank and in 2000 it was renamed the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) by the Fijian 
government with a view to provide a common marketplace for companies and organisations 
in the South Pacific region
2
. Eleven years later it continues to list solely Fiji-based entities 
with no representation from any other member nations of the Pacific Islands Forum 
countries
3
. Only 18 companies were publicly listed in 2010 with a combined trading volume 
of only F$2.7 million (SPSE, 2011). Evidence shows that market capitalization declined 
10.06 percent in 2009 (F$1,002 million in 2008 to F$901 million) and figures for 2010 show 
the market capitalisation further declined by 13.68 percent to F$778 million (SPSE, 2011).  
                                                          
2 Include  Cook Islands, Kiribati, Niue, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. 
3 Include Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji (suspended, May 2009), Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.  
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In addition to the series of coup d‟état that occurred in Fiji, myriad of other factors have also 
contributed to the slow recovery of the capital market in Fiji. Political instability, regulations 
protecting shareholder rights, in particular minority shareholder rights and the quality of 
corporate governance practices are some of the contributory factors.  Other factors include: 
risk averse (small and mum/dad) investors tend to favour banks deposits to risky investments; 
less educated and unsophisticated investors; underdeveloped brokerage community; low level 
of interest from local and member countries business community; lack of clarity and 
understanding of the legislation regarding protection of shareholder/minority rights. These 
factors are further culminated by the restrictions imposed by the regulatory regimes of 
individual island nations and the lack of accessibility because of the absence of an IT-based 
trading infrastructure. More importantly, political instability created by coups of 1987, 2000 
and 2006 have raised international awareness that Fiji is not a safe place for investment and 
thus signaled investors both local and international to stay away. Subsequent coups have 
created reputation internationally that there exists a „coup-culture‟ in Fiji (Fraenkel, 2009).  
Past studies have suggested that strengthening legal institutions may be an essential pre-
requisite for financial development and, through it, for stronger economic development 
(Asian Development Bank, 2001; Chand, 2002; Sharma & Nguyen, 2010). Although relevant 
securities market regulations did exist in Fiji, the implementation seems to be less visible. 
CMDA conducts investigations and deals with the offenders in Fiji, whereas the courts seem 
to have more power to deal with the breaches/offences relating to capital markets in Australia 
(Sudhakar, 2000). In support Sharma and Nguyen (2010, 23), report that “... although 
shareholders in Fiji enjoy strong legal protection, both existing and potential shareholders do 
not have a very good knowledge of what these protective measures are.” This suggests that 
there has been a lack of will to prosecute perpetrators for breaching securities market 
regulations and as a consequence, shareholders are not aware of the existence of regulations 
that could protect them and its effectiveness.  
Furthermore, SPSE listing requirements allow up to 90% of equities to be held by directors of 
the company (Mala & White, 2009) and as a consequence, the listed companies show a high 
degree of concentration of ownership with a controlling interest typically in the hands of a 
single shareholder (Patel, 2002). Although this reflects Fiji‟s private company ownership 
culture, it is also an indication of the existence of a weak minority shareholder rights 
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protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002) in Fiji. Both, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Gugler (1999) provide empirical evidence that block shareholders do 
receive private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. In addition, poor standard of 
corporate governance practices were akin to a number of private and public sector 
organisations during the period 1987 to 2006. Lal and Vakatora (1997) state that “ ... 
accountability and principles of good governance were rapidly compromised as expectations 
of certain sections of the community as well as individuals had been raised; the easiest to 
meet these expectations and tastes was through cronyism, nepotism, patronage, etc., which 
became the norm...” The untoward practices were discovered too late where vast amount of 
money has already been squandered. Examples of such practices have been experienced in 
the National Bank of Fiji, National Provident Fund, Fijian public sector corporate entities and 
government departments (Larmour, 2008). This is not surprising as Transparency 
International Corruption Index (CPI) (based on perception of journalists and investment risk 
analysts) in 2005 rated Fiji a below-average 4 on a scale of 0-10, where 10 being „highly 
clean‟ and 0 „highly corrupt‟ (Transparency International, 2005). In a worldwide governance 
survey Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) scored Fiji below zero in most of the 
governance categories. The governance score range between -2.5 and 2.5 and scores for Fiji 
for 2008 and 2009 are as follows: voice and accountability (-0.48, -0.72), political stability 
(+0.01, -0.22), government and stability (-0.84, -0.96), regulatory quality (-0.67, -0.95), rule 
of law (-0.55, -0.96) and control of corruption (-0.43, -0.74). In all categories, the governance 
scores have declined in 2009 compared to 2008. Further, Larmour (2008) and Olaks (2001) 
report corruption exiting in both the public
4,5
 and as well the private sector
6
 in Fiji.  These 
have a negative effect on Fiji‟s image internationally and also reflects on Fiji‟s investment 
climate.   
                                                          
4
 The culture of kickbacks (extra payment required for permits and licenses), greasing palms (bribes to 
officials), nepotism/cronyism (favouritism in recruitment, promotion, contracting, and outsourcing), pulling 
ranks (using political or social status to bent rules), unfair and unethical decisions on procurement (political 
interference) and misuse and abuse of public funds (where delegation not clearly communicated or 
monitored) (Larmour, 2008).  
5
 Fiji National Provident Fund, The Fiji Ports Authority, Fiji Pine Limited, Lands department, Ministry of 
Fisheries and Forestry,  The Native Land Trust Board (Larmour, 2008).  
6
 Overpricing by importers, by purchasing through offshore entities (Larmour, 2008) and bribery of supervisory 
officials (Olaks Consulting, 2001). 
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Research show that governance indicators are positively correlated with foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Okere, Tamule, & Maloney, 2010) thus providing support to the view that 
countries striding to attract foreign capital need to improve and maintain various aspects of 
good corporate governance practices to maximise long-run economic welfare, both for the 
foreign and domestic investors as well as the wider market participants (Gani, 2007).  With a 
view to improve market activity and investment climate in Fiji, the administration of the 
CMDA was transferred in 2009 to the Reserve Bank under the Capital Markets Decree 2009 
(Reddy, 2010). In March 2010, the Capital Markets Development Taskforce was established 
within the Reserve Bank serving as a “think tank” for the capital markets development. 
Furthermore, Fiji government offer to incentivise companies listed on the SPSE by reducing 
their  corporate tax of 20 percent (Reddy, 2010).   
The adoption of the „comply or explain‟ principle-based corporate governance approach by 
CMDA is in line with the international best practices. Also flexibility provided by the 
„comply and explain‟ approach will enable individual companies and/or industries to tailor 
make corporate governance practices for their own circumstances, thus improving the quality 
and standard of corporate governance practiced in Fiji (CMDA, 2008). Since principle-based 
governance approach is voluntary, flexible and non-binding, it will encourage companies in 
different industries to develop industry-specific corporate governance structures. Companies 
that are large and have complicated structures will be able to adopt more sophisticated 
governance structures compared to small size companies.  
However, it is argued that the “comply or explain” policies are paradoxical. On one hand, it 
claims to be voluntary in nature, on the other, it has been legitimised through incorporation 
into the SPSE listing requirement that companies are obliged to disclose any deviations from 
the set principles and guidelines. Furthermore, it emphasises that governance should be 
tailored for each company‟s circumstances and on the other hand, it prescribes a uniform set 
of governance standards (for example, separation of chair and CEO positions, at least thirty 
percent non-executive/independent directors, and board sub-committees) against which all 
listed companies should report their practices
7
. The prescription of uniform standards 
                                                          
7
 The companies reporting on corporate governance practices in their annual reports will have to explain why 
they have deviated from the set guidelines. This will put pressure on companies to comply rather than explain 
to the investors. 
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implicitly makes the CMDA recommendations compulsory for listed companies and 
therefore, will increase their compliance costs. Also, „comply or explain‟ requirements do not 
provide any clarity to the investors‟ as to how to judge what constitutes a good explanation 
for non-compliance that can be relied upon for decision making. As CMDA do not rank 
explanations provided by companies for non-compliance, it becomes difficult for the market 
to decide whether it is a good explanation or not. In absence of clear guidelines, it becomes 
much harder to determine if any offence is committed and difficult to prosecute, therefore 
easier to escape liability. As Farrar (2005) sums up that principles-based corporate 
governance practices have a lot of roar but no teeth to bite.  
The Bainimarama Government in 2007 established Fiji Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (FIAC) to investigate the reported cases of complaints and corruption existing in 
Fiji. Initiatives undertaken by the Fiji government to improve investor confidence has been 
welcomed by both the market and investors. The international rating agency Standard and 
Poor‟s recently upgraded Fiji‟s credit rating to B and estimated that Fiji economy in 2011 
will grow by 1.3 percent (Vuibau, 2011). The evidence from SPSE also suggests that listed 
companies have complied with the corporate governance code.  The next section provides the 
theoretical basis for the study. 
3 Theoretical basis 
Institutional theory emphasises that social systems and individuals not only compete for 
resources but ultimately seek legitimacy (Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008; Suchman, 1995).  
From this perspective, one of the keys to understanding social systems is to study the forces 
within the institutional environment that guide or constrain legitimacy seeking.  A critical 
assumption within institutional theory is that all social actors are seeking legitimacy and/ or 
reinventing legitimacy norms within institutional environment.  These constraints and forces 
converge to create isomorphism, or similarity of structure, thought and action, within 
institutional environments. 
The theory argues that organisations conform to norms and trends in their organisational field 
in order to gain social legitimacy.  Legitimacy is a state of being considered acceptable in the 
eyes of internal and external stakeholders (Suchman, 1995).  One way firms achieve 
legitimacy is by similarly modelling themselves after the traits and behaviour of other 
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legitimate organisations around them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 1991). Implicit in the 
institutional theory argument is the idea that seeking legitimacy through mimicry does not 
always bring economic efficiencies. 
Organisational behaviours can be described in terms of isomorphism, which is caused by 
institutional pressures and expectations.  Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces 
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face a similar set of environmental 
conditions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Institutional theory shows how organisational 
behaviour respond not only to market pressures, but also to institutional pressures such as 
pressures from general social expectations and the actions of leading organisations (Chizema 
& Buck, 2006). 
Three classifications of institutional isomorphism have been proposed: coercive, mimetic and 
normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 1991). Coercive isomorphism results from both 
formal and informal pressure imposed on an organisation by another party upon which it is 
dependent, and by expectations of the society within which it operates. Mimetic isomorphism 
occurs when the organisation faces uncertainty that engenders organisations to model 
themselves after other organisations that they perceive to be legitimate.  Mimicking others 
may act as a cost-effective way of getting legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 1991; 
Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Normative isomorphism is where the norms of societies and 
professional bodies influence the practices of organisations.  Normative pressures arise from 
specialised groups such as profession. 
The corporate governance system refers to one of the means through which a nation channels 
corporate power for the good of society so that wealth is created efficiently and distributed 
fairly within a national economy (Judge et al., 2008; Monks, 2007).  Therefore, corporate 
governance legitimacy is conceptualised as one of the means by which a nation constrains 
and directs corporate power so that it efficiently creates economic value and distributes fairly 
economic wealth.  According to Judge et al. (2008), the antecedents of corporate governance 
legitimacy are much less shared and hence, much less understood.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983; 1991) argue that organisations have to appear legitimate to their 
broader constituencies and stakeholders in order to secure the resources they need for 
continued survival.  To gain this legitimacy, organisations have to be seen to conform to what 
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is expected of them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 1991; Lounsbury, 2008). Covaleski and 
Dirsmith (1988) suggest that an organisation‟s survival requires it to conform to societal 
norms of acceptable behaviour.  The advantages of compliance to institutional norms are 
revealed in the literature as increased prestige for the organisation, stability, legitimacy, 
social support, acceptance in the profession and invulnerability to questioning (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). 
Institutional theorists emphasised a distinction between technical forces and legitimacy.  This 
was apparent in empirical research that emphasised a two-stage diffusion process whereby 
early adopters of innovation are motivated by technical considerations while the later adopter 
engage in imitation fuelled by pressure to conform (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996). The key 
insight of institutional theory is that organisations seek not only resources and customers but 
also social legitimacy.  Legitimacy is a state of being considered acceptable in the eyes of 
internal and external stakeholders (Suchman, 1995).  One way companies achieve legitimacy 
is by similarly modelling themselves after the traits and behaviours of other legitimate 
organisation around them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  The kind of mimicry is considered 
partly responsible for the widespread diffusion of various organisational forms and strategies 
(Eapen & Krishnan, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  The next section delineates the research 
method for the study. 
4 Research Method 
Empirical studies conducted overseas relating to larger economies, mature capital markets 
and larger publicly listed companies provide support to the view that improved corporate 
governance practices have a positive effect on company financial performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q. However, capital market is Fiji is small, still in its infancy and have only a 
handful of small companies listed, which provide a completely different environment to 
undertake study relating to corporate governance practices. Furthermore, corporate 
governance codes and/or principles, and guidelines have been in existence only since 1992 
(revised in 2004) and relatively little research has been undertaken on their underlying 
mechanisms. An understanding of the dynamics of so-called soft regulation in general is 
rather limited. It is difficult to ascertain whether changes to corporate governance practices in 
Fiji have been made for the benefit of the shareholders or simply to comply with the 
regulation that has been applied in other countries. This study is novel as it explores corporate 
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governance practices of publicly listed companies which are different from companies that 
exist in larger economies and also uses a larger number of variables, including: board size, 
board gender diversity, board sub-committees (audit, remuneration and nomination), 
ownership (block and insider), leverage and dividends.   
Data for this study was obtained from the SPSE website and from annual reports of the 
companies listed. There were sixteen companies publicly listed for the period 2008 to 2009 
and eighteen companies in 2010. Since 7 companies did not provide all the information in 
2010, only eleven companies were included in our sample for 2010. SPSE annual report was 
also collected for 2007 to 2009.  In addition, qualitative data was also gathered through 
interviews with the SPSE CEO and other staff between 2007 and 2008 over corporate 
governance issues.  The use of multiple data sources allow a more comprehensive and valid 
portrayal of the phenomena compared to a single source of data (Jick, 1979; Modell, 2005).  
The interviews lasted between an hour and two.  The topics selected for interviews were 
mainly on the corporate governance practices in Fiji‟s capital market.  Most questions were 
asked in an open-ended manner to encourage interviewees to respond in their own ways.  The 
aim was to generate a rich source of field evidence.  
4.1 Dependent Variables 
Tobin‟s Q is regarded as a futuristic and forward-looking performance financial performance 
measure used as a dependent variable (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Chung & Pruitt, 1994; 
Hossain, Prevost, & Rao, 2001; Kang & Stulz, 1996; Reddy, Locke, & Scrimgeour, 2010), 
therefore, we also use Tobin‟s Q as a dependent variable. Tobin‟s Q is estimated as: 
AssetsTotal
DebtTSNetDebtTLMVE
QsTobin

'  
where MVE (the market value estimate) is a product of a company‟s share price and the 
common stock outstanding, L/T Debt is the book value of long term liabilities; Net S/T Debt 
is book value of current liabilities less current assets. Total assets is the depreciated book 
value of tangible assets.  
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Finch and Shivadasani (2006), and Thomsen, Pedersen and 
Kvist (2006) have also used accounting-based performance measures such as  return on assets 
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and return on equity as well. It has been argued that accounting-based performance measures 
are backward-looking and it only partially estimates future events in the form of depreciation 
and amortization (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Considering the above concerns and to have 
alternative results, the accounting-based performance measures (return of assets (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE) and proportion of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization to total revenue (EBITDA2REV) are also used.  ROA, ROE and EBITDA2REV 
are measured as follows: 
AssetsTotal
taxafterEarnings
ROA   
EquityTotal
taxafterEarnings
ROE   
RevenueTotal
nAmortzatioon,DepreciatiTax,Interest,BeforeEarnings
EBITDA2REV  
4.2 Independent Variables 
The control variables employed in this study are estimated as follows:  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest incentive alignment hypothesis to mitigate agency 
problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. By giving managers shares in 
companies is one way of aligning managers‟ interests with that of the shareholders. Although 
Jensen and Meckling initially focused on only managerial ownership, this argument has been 
extended to board members as well (Dalton, Daily, Trevis, & Roengpitya, 2003). Based on 
the above proposition, we use insider ownership (IOWN) to determine the effect it has on 
financial performance. Insider ownership is the proportion of shares held by all members of 
the board of directors including top officers of the company who are members of the board 
divided by total ordinary shares outstanding.  
Empirical evidence suggests that block ownership have a potential to mitigate a number of 
agency problem inherent in the company (Prowse, 1994). Large shares give blockholders‟ 
power to make management serve their interest (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990; Hill & Snell, 
1988, 1989), thus improves financial performance. By using active monitoring hypothesis, 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue blockholders are better 
monitors than other type of shareholders. Since blockholding is permitted in Fiji, we want to 
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investigate if blockholding has similar effect on financial performance in Fiji as well. We 
measure blockholding (BOWN) as the proportion of shares held by the 20 largest 
shareholders of the company.  
Jensen (1983) suggests that a board should have seven to eight members to function 
effectively. The SPSE listing rules 6.35 only specify that the minimum number of Directors 
in listed companies should be three (SPSE, 2010). However, proponents of large board size 
argue using resource dependency theory (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000) that large boards tend to provide an increased pool of expertise 
and linkages that companies need. On the other hand, the proponents of small board size 
argue that smaller boards are more likely to reach consensus and allow members to have 
genuine debate and interaction (Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994). However, others argue that 
optimality of board size is situational, that is, it depends on the nature of the company. In a 
similar way, we also investigate the effect board size of companies in Fiji have on the 
financial performance. We use natural log of board size (Ln(BDS))  as a proxy for board size.  
The proponents of board-as-monitors argue that a board that is independent of management 
and dependent on shareholders will be more effective in aligning the interest of managers and 
shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). In policy statements Cadbury Report (1992), 
Greenbury Report (Study Group on Directors‟ Remuneration, 1995), Hampel Report 
(Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998) and Turnbull Report (ICEAW, 1999) have 
highlighted the special contribution non-executive and independent directors can make to this 
process.  SPSE listing rules 6.36 articulate that at least one third of the Directors must be 
independent (SPSE, 2010).   
The annual reports of listed companies have not explicitly identified directors as either 
“executive” and “non-executive” directors, and have disclosed very little information 
regarding the directors to external stakeholders. The general lack of disclosure of such 
information by companies in their annual reports and in other forms of corporate 
communication means these inconsistencies cannot be corrected retrospectively. Some 
previous  researchers have avoided the word “independence” by using “outside directors” to 
describe directors who are presumed to be independent from management (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, 
& Sengupta, 2005; Hossain et al., 2001), or simply consider potential differences between 
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“non-executive” and “executive” directors. Other studies acknowledge a director‟s 
independence when he/she is independent from senior management of the company 
(Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004; Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 
2004)  
The publication of the CMDA principles and guidelines clarifies what constitutes an 
independent director.  Consequently, there will be some consistency in the reporting of 
independent directors after 2009. Due to the inconsistencies in reporting, a director may have 
been reported to be independent but is not and a director may have not reported to be 
independent, but in fact is. To reduce the effect of any bias arising from the inconsistent 
reporting of independent directors, non-executive/independent directors (NED) are used, that 
is, directors that are reported to be either non-executive and/or independent. Non-
Executive/Independent Directors (NED) is the proportion of the non-executive/independent 
directors on the board. 
The diversity literature suggests diversity adversely impacts group dynamics, but improves 
group decision-making. Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) argue that board diversity 
improves boards understanding of the market place, increases creativity, innovation and 
effectiveness when problem solving. Arfken, Bellar and Reeb (2004) argue that board 
diversity promotes global relationships and increases board independence and asks questions 
that would not come from directors with similar backgrounds. Therefore, we use a proportion 
of female directors on board as a proxy for board diversity (DIVERS).  
Empirical research focusing on the presence of an audit committee has been associated with 
fewer financial reporting problems (McMullen, 1996) and is positively related to factors 
associated with the benefits of monitoring (John & Senbet, 1998). Main and Johnston (1998) 
and Weir and Laing (2001) report that remuneration committee has a positive effect on 
financial performance. To study the effect board subcommittees have on companies‟ financial 
performance, two dummy variables are created. The Audit Committee (ACOM) is the 
dummy variable set equal to “1” if companies have an audit committee; otherwise it is set 
equal to “0”. A Remuneration committee (RCOM) is the dummy variable set equal to “1” if 
companies have a remuneration committee; otherwise it is set equal to “0”.  
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The extant literature views debt as an internal corporate governance mechanism that can 
voluntarily be used to transfer the functions of monitoring and evaluating managerial 
performance to the capital market (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Begley & Feltham, 1999; 
Jensen, 1986). According to Grossman and Hart (1988) debt forces managers to consume 
fewer perquisites and become more efficient. To investigate the effect of debt on financial 
performance, we use leverage (LEV) which is the proportion of the debt defined as long term 
liabilities plus short-term liabilities divided by the total assets.  
Easterbrook (1984) argue that dividends play a role in controlling equity agency problems by 
facilitating primary capital market monitoring of the company activities and performance.  To 
investigate the effect of dividends on financial performance, we use DIV2TA which is the 
dollar amount of the dividend paid by the company divided by book value of the total assets.  
We use the natural log of total revenue (Ln(REV)) as proxy for company size.  
Company level risk (FMRISK) is the standard deviation of the quarterly stock price of the 
company for the period 2008 through to 2010.  
To study the effect of the growth/decline of the Fijian economy have had on company 
financial performance, a variable RGDP is created. RGDP is the yearly real growth rate. 
To study the effect corporate governance practices of different industries have on financial 
performance, four industry dummy variables are created. SPSE listed companies are divided 
into four sectors, viz, goods (food, textile & apparel, intermediate & durables), property, 
service (transport, port, leisure & tourism, media & communication, finance & other 
services), and investment. Therefore four industry dummy variables are introduced. IND1 is 
the dummy variable equal to “1” if the company belongs to goods industry, otherwise equal 
to “0”. IND2 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the company belongs to property industry, 
otherwise equal to “0”. IND3 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the company belongs to 
service industry, otherwise equal to “0”. IND4 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the 
company belongs to investment industry, otherwise equal to “0”.  
Table 1 provides a summary of dependent and control variables used and their method of 
measurement. 
<insert table 1 here> 
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4.3 Model Specification 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis allowing ownership to have a simple 
linear relationship to establish if governance and control mechanisms have an effect on firm 
financial performance. The model is estimated as follows: 
)1(eRGDPβ
IND4βIND3βIND2βIND1βFMRISKβRCOMβACOMβLn(REV)β
DIV2TAβLEVβDIVERSβ BDSβNEDβBOWNβLOWNβIOWNβαFP
27
2625242322212019
18171615141312111



 
where FP = Tobin‟s Q, ROA or EBITDA2REV  
Equation (1) determines the relationship between financial performance and governance 
mechanisms of companies that were in compliant with CMDA recommendations since 2008.  
This is undertaken for the four company financial performance measures.  
A number of researchers (Han & Suk, 1998; McConnell & Servaes, 1990, 1995; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Steiner, 1996; Stulz, 1988) have suggested the relationship 
between insider ownership and financial performance is non-monotonic. Based on this view, 
we have divided IOWN into two categories, that is, whether IOWN is less than 20 percent or 
greater than equal to 20 percent. Dummy variable LESS20 is equal to 1 if IOWN is less than 
20 percent otherwise equal to 0.  Dummy variable OVER20 is equal to 1 if IOWN is over 20 
percent otherwise equal to 0.  
 
)2(e OVER20βLESS20β
IND4βIND3βIND2βIND1βFMRISKβRCOMβACOMβLn(REV)β
DIV2TAβLEVβDIVERSβBDSβNEDβBOWNβLOWNβIOWNβαFP
3837
3635343332313029
28272625242322212
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

  
Equation (2) estimates whether a piecewise linear relationship exists between managerial 
ownership and company financial performance. 
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5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
<insert Table 2 here> 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the sample descriptive statistics for the panel data. The mean 
(median) Tobin‟s Q ratio is 1.03 (1.09), thus indicate that the publicly listed companies in Fiji 
did create value for the shareholders. The mean (median) of ROA ratio is 2% (6%) indicate 
that companies on average have positive performance and this is a reflection that assets of the 
companies were utilised in an efficient manner. The mean (median) of ROE is 16% (13%) 
indicate that publicly listed companies in Fiji did invest shareholders funds appropriately that 
resulted in a respective return for the shareholders. The mean (median) EBITDA2REV is 
0.13 (0.15) indicate that for dollar of revenue received by the company, the operating margin 
is approximately 13%. All financial performance measures are positive.  
The mean proportion of insider ownership (IOWN) is 18% and median 0% which indicate 
that in fifty percent of the listed companies, insider ownership is zero. Since the 25
th
 
percentile is 0% and 75
th
 percentile is 69%,indicate that some publicly listed companies have 
adopted the policy of remunerating managers with shares to align the interest of the 
management with the shareholders. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) such practices 
have a tendency to mitigate agency cost.  
The mean (median) proportion of stock held by the 20 largest shareholders (BOWN) is 91% 
(95%) with the inter-quartile range of 82%-99%. In comparison basis, blockholding in New 
Zealand is 76.3% (Reddy et al., 2010). However, the non-controlling shareholder in the US 
hold 80 per cent of the shares and in the UK, the figure is around 90 per cent for the top 20 
companies (Kapopoulas & Lazaretou, 2007). Since the non-controlling shareholders hold 
very dismal proportion of shares in Fiji indicate that there is a need for a strong protection of 
minority shareholder rights in Fiji. In summary, there is evidence that insiders‟ own large 
proportion of the company and blockholding is relatively high. This suggests insider 
ownership is not a strong mechanism itself to deal with agency problems in Fijian context.  
The mean (median) proportion of non-executive/independent directors is 0.22 (0) with an 
inter-quartile range of 0 to 1. The typical (median) board has 5.68 directors with a narrow 
inter-quartile range of four to eight members. On average, 76% of the companies have an 
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Audit Committee, 24% have a Remuneration Committee and 22% have a Nomination 
Committee. It is to be noted that not all companies reported having board committees nor any 
explanation was provided in the annual reports for not providing such information.  
The mean (median) dividend to total assets is 4% (3%) and inter-quartile range of 0%-10%, 
indicating that listed companies are retaining high proportion of the profits for investments 
purposes as the small nature of capital market makes it difficult to raise capital otherwise. 
The mean (median) leverage is 40% (36%). This shows that companies are not highly 
leverage, thus supporting the view that companies use retained earnings as a source of funds 
for investments. The mean (median) Ln(TA) is 4.50 (4.56). The mean (median) firm level 
risk is 0.23 (0.07) and the inter-quartile range of 0.00-1.05. On average, 49% of the 
companies in the sample belong to goods industry, 2% property, 32% service and 17% 
investment. This provides an opportunity to study the differences in the corporate governance 
practices in different industries. 
5.2 Correlation Analysis 
<insert Table 3 here> 
Table 3, presents a pairwise correlation matrix for control variables. Control variables are not 
highly correlated with each other. There is a positive correlation between LOWN and BOWN 
indicating large owners make up high proportion of block ownership in publicly listed 
companies in Fiji. BDS is negatively correlated with IOWN and LOWN, indicating large 
board size is associated with low level of insider ownership and also, the proportion of shares 
held by a single large owner tends to be lower. On the other hand, DIVERS is positively 
correlated with BDS, indicating large boards tend to have more female board members.  
NCOM is negatively correlated with LOWN indicating nomination committee reduces the 
influence of the large shareholders. Company size is positively correlated with BDS. The 
highest correlation of the independent variables is between Ln(REV) and BDS at 0.57 and 
between DIVERS and BDS at 0.53. The other high correlations are between BDS and LOWN 
at -0.43, FMRISK and ACOM at -0.40, and between FMRISK and RCOM at 0.40. None of 
the pairwise correlations between independent variables are above 0.57, indicating that the 
likelihood of multicollinearity issues arising in the OLS regressions is low.  
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5.3 OLS Regression Dependent and Independent variables 
<insert Table 4 here> 
Table 4 report the OLS regression results for equation 1. Column 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 4 
provide coefficients of independent variables that are used in equation 1. The results reported 
in column 2 of Table 4 are the coefficients of the independent variables using Tobin‟s Q as a 
dependent variable. The independent variables ACOM and RCOM have positive coefficients, 
indicating that these variables have a positive effect on financial performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q. Both these variables are statistically significant at 5% level. This evidence 
supports the view that both audit and remuneration committee are good mechanisms for 
monitoring managers‟ behaviour. DIV2TA also have a positive effect Tobin‟s Q, indicating 
that the payment of dividend is regarded by the market to be a better utilisation of firm‟s cash 
flows.  This finding supports Jensen‟s (1986) proposition that dividend payments dissipates 
cash which might otherwise be  wasted on non value-maximising projects, thus reducing the 
extent of overinvestment by managers. 
Both insider ownership (IOWN) and largest owner (LOWN) have negative coefficients and 
are statistically significant at 5% level. This indicates that the ownership is not at an optimal 
level in companies in Fiji. Since Fijian regulation allows companies to have concentrated 
ownership structure, thus reducing liquidity in the capital market.  
Board independence (NED) and female directors on boards (FD) both have negative 
coefficient but are not statistically significant. This result indicates that neither board 
independence nor female board members are adding value to the company. However, it 
should be noted that it was difficult to establish whether board members were independent 
from limited information provided in the companies‟ annual reports. However, for companies 
we could establish the nature of board independence, the results do indicate that both board 
independence and female directors have a negative effect of Tobin‟s Q.  
A negative coefficient of Ln(REV), which is statistically significant at 5% level, indicates 
that size has a negative effect on Tobin‟s Q. This raises questions about the size of firms in 
Fiji as to whether it has been increased to derive personal benefits for the managers.  Only the 
coefficient of the goods industry (IND1) is statistically significant at 10% level, thus 
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indicating that governance practices in goods industry contributes positively towards Tobin‟s 
Q.  
Table 4, columns 4, 6 and 8 provide coefficients of the independent variables used in 
equation 1 using ROA, ROE and EBITDA2REV as dependent variables. The results reported 
in columns 4, 6, and 8 are similar. IOWN has a negative coefficient and is statistically 
significant at 5% level which is similar result to that reported in column 2. The coefficient of 
BDS is negative and is statistically significant at 10% level suggest that board size of listed 
companies are not at an optimal level. This supports the findings reported by Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) that large boards are less effective  monitors because of the inability of the 
members to fully express their ideas and concerns during board meetings. The SPSE listing 
rules states that minimum board size should be three, but average board size is 5.68 (refer to 
Table 2) which is close to what Jensen (1983) suggests to be an optimal board size for the 
listed companies in the US. In comparison to the size of companies in the US and Fiji, 5.68 
board members seem bit high for Fiji.  
LEV has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at 1% level. This shows that 
leverage contributes positively towards financial performance measured by ROA, ROE and 
EBIDTA2REV. This shows that LEV is an effective mechanism to control managerial 
behaviour. Borrowing allows a portion of the company‟s cash flows to be returned to the 
bondholders which reduces the discretionary power of the managers and also, it increases the 
risk level of the company as well.  Therefore, managers have to invest remaining cash flows 
in high value generating projects. The other statistically significant results are for DIV2TA 
and Ln(REV) each having positive coefficients. The results indicate that dividend payouts 
contribute positively towards financial performance measured by ROA, ROE and 
EBITDA2REV. Firm size (Ln(REV)) also has a positive coefficient thus indicate that high 
revenue leads to high return for the shareholders. Similar to the results reported in column 2, 
only the coefficient of the goods industry (IND1) is statistically significant at 10% level.  
This indicates that the corporate governance practices in the goods industry is having a 
positive effect on financial performance measured by both Tobin‟s Q and EBITDA2REV. 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Fiji 
 
20 
 
5.4 OLS Regression with Dependent and Ownership, Governance and Control Variables 
<insert Table 5 here> 
In Table 5 variable LOWN and BOWN has a negative coefficient and is statistically 
significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Studies undertaken in the Sweden, Israel, Italy 
and Switzerland (see Horner, 1988; Levy, 1982; Rydqvist, 1987; Zingales, 1994) where 
concentrated ownership is a norm suggests that expropriation of private benefits by 
controlling blockholders is a major problem. This evidence suggest that largest owner and the 
block owner may be the original owner that started the business and are holding a high 
proportion of the shares after going public.  
The coefficient of IOWN is positive and not statistically significant. However, empirical 
evidence suggest that small proportion of insider ownership is positively associated with 
financial performance and  large proportion of insider ownership is negatively associated 
with financial performance (see Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Kole, 1996; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Wruck, 1989). Based on this reasoning, we have also 
tested whether insider ownership less than 20% and over 20% are statistically significant. 
Results reported in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 5 show that none of the variables are 
statistically significant.  The next section examines the role of Asian Development Bank and 
the South Pacific Stock Exchange on corporate governance practices. 
6.  Role of Asian Development Bank and South Pacific Stock Exchange 
6.1  Role of Asian Development Bank  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has played a major role in the establishment of the 
Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) and promotion of good corporate 
governance practices in Fiji. As a major donor agency
8
, ADB promoted privatisation of 
government business entities such as telecommunication, electricity utilities amongst others 
(Reddy & Sharma, 2011). Furthermore, ADB recommended to the Fiji government to support 
the establishment of CMDA whose functions have now been transferred to the Reserve Bank 
of Fiji. The ADB findings revealed that there is a limited range of saving and investment 
instruments available to the public and a corresponding lack of financing mechanisms 
                                                          
8
 The Fiji government has received F$326.6 million in loans since joining ADB in 1970 (ADB, 2001). 
Corporate Governance in Fiji 
 
21 
 
available to support private sector investment (ADB, 1996).  This is reflected in high liquidity 
and intermediation margins in the banking system, but low levels of capital investment in the 
economy.  According to ADB report (1996), public awareness of stock exchange and its role 
has been minimal and market turnover prior to 1996 has been insignificant at less than 
F$100,000 per annum.  With recommendations from Asian Development Bank, the Fiji 
government is improving the environment for capital market activity with tax incentives to 
encourage companies to list on the Stock Exchange introduced in 1996.  Also there is tax 
incentive for local shareholders.  The dividend income is tax exempted for local residents.  
The Asian Development Bank (1996) reports that a grant of F$600,000 was approved for the 
establishment of Capital Market Development Authority in Fiji whose functions have now 
been transferred to Reserve Bank of Fiji.  The technical assistance from ADB in setting up 
Capital Market Development Authority in 1996 met the cost of a senior advisor who provided 
technical advice to the locally recruited chief executive of CMDA for a period of 16 months.  
The ADB provided CMDA to secure the input of up to four short-term international technical 
advisers for a total input of up to four months (Asian Development Bank, 1996).  The total 
cost of technical assistance by ADB was at US$630,000 (Asian Development Bank, 1996, 
p.5).  Individual consultants were internationally recruited for the technical assistance.   
The role of the Reserve Bank of Fiji is to oversee the effective and efficient operations of 
capital markets.  According to Chand (2005), the ADB believes that the development of 
effective capital markets, partly through good accounting, is a most important way of 
promoting growth in the emerging economies.  In order to attract international investment, 
Fiji has to look at the accounting standard it follows, to see whether it embodies international 
best practice.  For example, a Fiji subsidiary reporting results to a parent company in 
Australia want accounts prepared by using internationally generally accepted practices.  The 
parent company does not want special rules operating in Fiji that would render the reports not 
so useful in Australia (Chand, 2005). 
The adoption of the international financial reporting system (IFRS) which has been 
encouraged by ADB may attract the MNCs and the financial institutions to register on the 
SPSE.  ADB has also insisted that the auditing of many of the projects they finance be carried 
out by an international firm of accountants and use internationally recognised (i.e., the IFRS 
or IRFS-compliant accounting standards) (ADB, 2002). 
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The ADB identifies the operation and functioning of capital market as a central means of 
enabling the Fiji government to effectively carry out its privatisation program and introduce 
domestic private sector shareholding in conjunction with foreign investors in several 
enterprises.  Interview with a senior manager at South Pacific Stock Exchange revealed an 
absence of liberal market for overseas investors willing to participate in the local market.  
The interviewee stated: 
There is uncertainty since the 2006 military coup.  The Reserve Bank has 
tightened its monetary policy.  Therefore, it becomes difficult for overseas 
investors to remit their money overseas. 
According to Reddy and Sharma (2011), overseas investors need to have a local bank account 
to have sales transaction proceeds deposited into their account.  However, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for overseas investors to open bank accounts in Fiji as the Banks need 
formal documentation such as local address of account holders, phone bills, local drivers 
licence and occupation in Fiji, amongst others to enable a bank account to be opened.  Some 
overseas investors‟ accounts are kept in a Trust by a local broker, Kontiki Capital Limited.  
While the SPSE management endeavours to have more international shareholder participation 
in the local market, the Fiji government‟s tight monetary policy somewhat inhibits that 
despite international interests in Fiji‟s capital market. 
Only a small number of individuals, as absentee owners, have a direct holding in equities, 
accounting for 4% of issued share capital in quoted companies (Patel, 2002; Chand, 2005).  
As the business ownership is concentrated, the information needs of the resource providers 
are satisfied in a relatively straightforward way.  An interviewee at SPSE stated: 
Very few individuals participate in the stock market and even those who do 
so are mainly business people. While the return on shares is higher, people 
still put money in banks which attract lower return. 
To provide greater public participation, the SPSE has been holding multiple workshops in 
various centres of the country, although the turnouts at such workshops were not so 
encouraging.  Attempts to get more indigenous Fijian shareholders‟ participation were done 
through radio and television advertisement.  For example, prominent Fijian figures such as 
former Reserve Bank governor were used in television who spoke in Fijian language about 
the importance of their participation in the capital market and the benefit reaped through 
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capital growth and dividend payment.  The SPSE had some impact by running workshops at 
indigenous provincial council levels.  The next section examines the role of SPSE in 
corporate governance. 
6.2  Role of SPSE in corporate governance practices 
The SPSE ensures that listing companies submit six monthly reports to them and comply with 
listing rules.  SPSE listing rules (2010) states that for the listing of shares, the total market 
capitalisation of the company must be at least F$1 million.  The applicants Memorandum and 
Article of Association must be consistent with the requirements of the Companies Act.  All 
half yearly financial statements shall be approved by the company‟s Board of Directors, and 
signed by two or more Directors of the company.  According to the SPSE (2010) a company 
is required to send a copy of its annual audited financial statements to the SPSE as soon as 
the accounts are available or no later than three months after the end of the annual accounting 
period. 
According to a manager at SPSE, the listed company needs to disclose immediate 
announcement of any information which include takeover, reduction in earnings or merely 
anything that have some impact on the business.  The annual reports are prepared in line with 
the Fiji Institute of Accountants requirement.  The first six monthly reports are interim report 
and need not be audited.  However, the final report is audited. 
According to Reddy and Sharma (2011), some stringent reporting is done by listed companies 
to their shareholders.  However, despite all rules, companies are reluctant to report bad news.  
For the annual reports, an interviewee stated that section 6.30 and 6.31 which is part of listing 
requirement has to be followed.  He went on to say:  
We don‟t want to create complexity in reporting as this may create fear for 
new companies wanting to come on board and get listed. 
Section 6.30 of the listing rule states: 
A company must send one copy to each shareholder and eight copies to the 
SPSE, its annual report as soon as the report is available or no later than four 
months after the end of annual accounting period (p.21). 
Further, section 6.31 specifies the content of annual report such as the audited financial 
statements have been prepared and presented in accordance with the accounting standards in 
Corporate Governance in Fiji 
 
24 
 
force in Fiji; a statement by the chairman, discussing the outlook for the company and any 
developments that might be expected in the industry in the next twelve months, 
supplementary information which in the opinion of the Directors is necessary for a reasonable 
appreciation of results amongst others.   
According to Mala and White (2009), stock exchange listing in emerging economies can be 
perceived as a status symbol.  Trading in the shares in the hands of the public at large has 
remained thin in Fiji.  On some days, there are hardly any trades on the stock exchange.  
Mala and White (2009, p.53) note that “in the first year of operations as a formal market 
(1997), the total value of shares traded was 0.001% of GDP, rising only to 0.004% in 2004 
(this compares with value of 0.4% for Australia and 0.38% for New Zealand) and falling 
back 0.001% in 2006.” 
Mala and White (2009) point out that a suitable regulatory, legal and supervisory 
environment is critical for effective stock markets.  Their research demonstrate that Fiji listed 
companies on the SPSE had long term confidence in the stock market and they felt that there 
would be public demand for their shares and that the value of shares would increase over 
time.  The authors noted that listed companies in Fiji view an IPO as a strategic reputation 
enhancing move and as a means of establishing and improving the market value of the 
company, rather than as a financing decision.  Further, to date in contrast to experiences such 
as Korean financial markets, no company in Fiji has sought additional finance from public 
subscription after listing.  Listed companies are well established, financially sound and can 
generate substantial finance through internal operations. 
The SPSE is faced with challenges of getting more companies listed on the stock exchange 
(Interview with CEO, SPSE).  Some 27 new companies were approached by SPSE for listing 
which the companies subsequently declined.  According to Mala and White (2009, p.60) the 
„potential to list companies‟, fear of loss of control and fear of disclosing the financial 
performance to competitors are pertinent influences in making the decision to list or not to 
list.  Mala and White (2009, p.60), for instance, report on a managing director of one of the 
family-based companies as justifying reasons for not listing as: 
Upon discussion with my family members regarding listing, they never 
expressed any interest in changing the business‟s family ownership structure 
and all of them said that they want to stay private to maintain control.  They 
Corporate Governance in Fiji 
 
25 
 
said that we do not have to focus on increasing the earnings only to increase 
the share price, but we want to focus on growing the business. 
Concerns in relation to the possible loss of control through making an IPO are evident.  
However, SPSE listing regulation allows up to 90% of the equity to be held by the directors 
of a company. 
Listing companies continue to demonstrate a high degree of concentrations of ownership with 
a controlling interest typically in the hands of a single shareholder as manifested in the 
concentration of equity holdings in listed companies (Patel, 2002; Mala & White, 2009).  
Companies contemplating listing would have no practical impediments in maintaining similar 
ownership structures and it appears that fears over loss of control are unsubstantiated.  
According to Mala and White (2009), reliance by companies to list would seem to be driven 
by perceptions among corporate directors and senior managers. 
To have a stock exchange listing can be perceived as a status symbol.  The Reserve Bank of 
Fiji, the SPSE and all other parties engaged in developing Fiji‟s economy through the capital 
market hope that in time corporate and investor attitudes will change, bringing greater 
volume of activity to the market.  The next section brings the narrative together and discusses 
the results in relation to the theoretical framework and draws out conclusion. 
7. Discussion/ Conclusion 
This study explained the nature and extent of compliance to the principal based corporate 
governance initiatives by the listed companies in SPSE in Fiji.  Three important questions are 
addressed: (i) whether listed companies in Fiji have complied with the principal-based 
governance practices; (ii) did compliance with principle-based recommendations lead to an 
improvement in the listed company‟s financial performance and (iii) how the institutional 
factors have contributed towards corporate governance practices in Fiji? 
In Fiji, the non-controlling shareholders hold very dismal proportion of shareholding in listed 
companies.  There may be a need to have rigorous protection of minority shareholders‟ rights 
to safeguard their interests which may in turn increase liquidity in the stock market.  There is 
evidence that insiders own large proportion of the company and blockholding is relatively 
high. 
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Descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 show that companies listed in SPSE did create value 
for shareholders, as the market value of companies‟ shares are greater than its book value.  
Also all financial performance measures (Tobin‟s Q, ROA, ROE, EBITDA2REV) are 
positive.  There is also evidence that in some companies insider ownership is high. 
Non-controlling shareholders holding dismal proportion of shares in listed companies in Fiji 
is of concern.  In stock exchanges that have a proportion of non-controlling shareholders also 
tend to have a high level of liquidity.  The companies (on an average basis) are not highly 
leveraged, thus supporting the view that companies use retained earnings as a source of funds 
for investment.  Block owners tends to be insiders of the company.  Both managerial 
ownership (MOWN) and large owner (LOWN) have negative coefficients and are 
statistically significant at 1%.  The results generally show that ownership is not at the 
optimum level for the listed companies in Fiji.   
In this study, we found that Fijian companies did create value for shareholders; all financial 
performance was positive.  The average proportion of stock held by the twenty largest 
shareholders is 92%.  There is a need to protect and safeguard minority shareholders‟ 
interests as majority of shareholders are held by “insiders” to company. 
There are myriad of factors that affect listing and provide plausible reasons for only a small 
number of companies being listed in the SPSE. These factors include: high proportion of 
block and/or institutional holding which signals that minority investors may be not well 
protected; risk averse small and mum/dad investors tends to deposit money in banks rather 
than undertake risky investments; less educated and unsophisticated investors; 
underdeveloped brokerage community; low level of interest from local and member countries 
business community; and lack of clarity and understanding of the legislation regarding 
protection of shareholder/minority rights. These factors are further culminated by the 
restrictions imposed by the regulatory regimes of individual island nations and the lack of 
accessibility because of the absence of an IT-based trading infrastructure. Furthermore, the 
political instability created in Fiji by coups of 1987, 2000 and 2006 have raised international 
awareness that Fiji is not a safe place for investment and thus signaling investors both local 
and international to stay away. The subsequent coups have created an international reputation 
of Fiji having a coup-culture.  
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According to Judge et al. (2008), corporate governance legitimacy is conceptualised as one of 
the means by which a nation constrains and directs corporate so that it efficiently creates 
economic value and equitably distributes economic wealth.  Hence the legitimacy of 
corporate governance system is pivotal to Fiji‟s economic system.  There were global 
pressures on Fiji to improve its corporate governance practices.  The donor agency of Asian 
Development Bank funded and supported the establishment of the Capital Market 
Development Authority in Fiji.  Some technical assistance in form of personnel was made 
available by the ADB for a brief period so that the locals are trained to undertake such 
governance exercise.  ADB was a source of coercive isomorphic pressure on Fiji‟s capital 
market which helped to enhance credibility and confidence and ultimately, the legitimacy of 
the companies. 
While seeking to preserve its legitimacy, companies have adopted such ideas as corporate 
governance codes of conduct and audit committees.  However, observers have noted that 
these governance actions result from institutional pressures and amount more to “myth and 
ceremony” than to substantive action and improved social welfare (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Judge et al., 2008).  Large proportion of equity in Fiji‟s capital market is owned by insiders 
such as board of directors and management of the respective companies. 
One of the functions of institutions is to constrain and standardise social behaviour through 
regulative mechanisms.  Therefore, regulative institutions such as CMDA and SPSE set rules, 
monitor complains, sanction certain activities and punish others.  Force, fear and expedience 
are certain ingredients of the regulative pillar (Suchman, 1995).  As such, the institution of 
law and order is institutional predictor of the legitimacy of corporate governance in Fiji.   
For our knowledge, this is an initial systematic study of institutional theory applied to 
corporate governance legitimacy study in Fiji.  To date, relatively little study have been 
undertaken regarding the compliance of listed companies in the corporate governance code in 
Fiji.  Our study intends to extend the literature on corporate governance practices in Fiji‟s 
financial market.  The study is based on a single emerging economy, Fiji and on corporate 
governance legitimacy.  One could question whether our results will hold for other empirical 
settings and strategic behaviours.     
Future research examining corporate governance may like to examine how other cognitive 
institutions such as ADB membership might influence corporate governance structure and 
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practices.  Such research could also be aimed at exploring corporate governance initiatives in 
non-listed companies in Fiji or extending the study to cover other parts of the Pacific Island 
region.  The study offers insights for policy makers interested in stock exchange listing 
requirements/ regulatory issues with associated compliance burdens is better informed as a 
consequence of the research.  The results inform Fijian managers, regulators and policy 
analysts who are seeking to evaluate the success of past reforms and determine path to further 
enhance both governance and performance.  Our research also offers some practical insights 
to executives of multinational firms that are seeking to do business in Fiji. 
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Table 1 
Dependent and Control Variables and their Method of Measurement 
Tobin‟s Q MVE (the market value estimate is a product of a company‟s share 
price and the common stock outstanding) + L/T Debt is the book 
value of long term liabilities + Net S/T Debt is book value of current 
liabilities less current assets/Total assets is the depreciated book value 
of tangible assets.  
 ROA Earnings After Tax/Total Assets 
 ROE Earnings After tax/Total Shareholders‟ Equity 
EBITDA2R
EV 
Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation/Total 
Revenue 
IOWN Proportion of shares held by the members of the board including top 
officers of the company who are members of the board 
LOWN Proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder of the company 
BOWN Proportion of shares held by twenty largest shareholders of the 
company 
BDS Natural log of Board size 
NED Proportion of directors that are non-executive/independent 
DIVERS Proportion of female directors on the board 
ACOM Dummy variable equal to “1” if company has a audit committee, 
otherwise „0” 
RCOM Dummy variable equal to “1” if company has a remuneration 
committee, otherwise „0” 
LEV Ratio of total liability to total assets 
DIV2TA Ratio of total dividends paid to total assets 
Ln(REV) Natural log of total revenue 
FMRISK Standard deviation of the quarterly stock price of the company for the 
year 
RGDP Real gross domestic product per year 
IND1 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company belongs to goods 
industry, otherwise “0”  
IND2 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company belongs to property 
industry, otherwise “0”  
IND3 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company belongs to service 
industry, otherwise “0”   
IND4 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company belongs to investment 
industry, otherwise “0”   
LESS20 Dummy variable equal to “1” if IOWN is less than 20 percent 
otherwise equal to “0” 
OVER20 Dummy variable equal to “1” if IOWN is greater than equal to 20 
percent otherwise equal to “0” 
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Table 2:Sample descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables 
 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Inter-quartile range 
 
Q-ratio 1.03 1.09 0.07 2.01 0.26 – 1.81 
ROA 0.02 0.06 -1.25 0.25 -0.09 – 0.15 
ROE 0.16 0.13 --0.33 2.74 -0.13 – 2.73 
EDITDA2REV 0.13 0.15 -0.95 0.51 -0.11– 0.43 
IOWN 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 – 0.69 
LOWN 0.45 0.45 0.01 0.90 0.14 – 0.75 
BOWN 0.91 0.95 0.16 1.00 0.82 – 0.99 
BDS 5.68 5.00 3 9 4 - 8 
NED 0.22 0.00 0.0 2 0 - 1 
FD 0.15 0.00 0.00 2 0 - 1 
LEV 0.40 0.36 0.04 1.44 0.13 – 0.68 
DIV2TA 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.00 – 0.10 
Log(TA) 4.50 4.56 3.42 5.71 3.59 – 5.52 
FMRISK 0.23 0.07 0.00 1.49 0.0 – 1.05 
ACOM 0.76 1.00 0 1  
RCOM 0.24 1.00 0 1  
IND1 0.49 0 0 1  
IND2 0.02 0 0 1  
IND3 0.32 0 0 1  
IND4 0.17 0 0 1  
Notes: Q ratio is Tobin‟s Q approximated by taking the sum of the market value of common equity, book value of long term 
liabilities, book value of net short term debt divided by the net fixed assets. ROA is the net income divided by book value of 
total assets. ROE is the net income divided by total shareholders‟ equity. EBITDA2REV is the proportion of earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation to total revenue.  IOWN is the proportion shares held by all members of the board 
of directors, including top officers of the firm who are members of the board to total shares outstanding. LOWN is the 
proportion of the shares held by the largest shareholder. LOWN is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder of 
the firm. BOWN is the proportion of shares held by 20 largest shareholders of the firm. BDS is the number of directors on 
the board. NED is the number of independent/non-executive directors on the board. ACOM is dummy variable set equal to 
“1” if companies have an audit committee, otherwise it is set equal to “0”. RCOM is dummy variable set equal to “1” if 
companies have remuneration committee, otherwise it is set equal to “0”. DIV2TA is the dividend divided by book value of 
the total assets. LEV is the proportion of the debt defined as long term liabilities plus short term liabilities divided by the 
total assets. Ln (TA) is the natural log of total assets is proxy for size. FMRISK is the standard deviation of the quarterly 
stock price of the company‟s stock for each year from 2008 to 2010. IND1 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the industry 
is goods; otherwise it is equal to “0”. IND2 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the industry is property or otherwise equal 
to “0”. IND3 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the industry is service; otherwise equal to “0”. IND4 is the dummy 
variable equal to “1” if the industry is investment; otherwise it is equal to “0”.  
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Table 3: Correlation matrix for control variables 
Notes: IOWN is the proportion shares held by all members of the board of directors, including top officers of the firm who are members of the board to total shares outstanding. LOWN is the proportion of the shares 
held by the largest shareholder. LOWN is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder of the firm. BOWN is the proportion of shares held by 20 largest shareholders of the firm. BDS is the number of 
directors on the board. NED is the proportion of the independent/non-executive directors on the board. DIVERS is the proportion of the female directors on the board. ACOM is dummy variable set equal to “1” if 
companies have an audit committee, otherwise it is set equal to “0”. RCOM is dummy variable set equal to “1” if companies have remuneration committee, otherwise it is set equal to “0”. DIV2TA is the dividend 
divided by book value of the total assets. LEV is the proportion of the debt defined as long term liabilities plus short term liabilities divided by the total assets. Ln (TA) is the natural log of total assets is proxy for size. 
FMRISK is the standard deviation of the quarterly stock price of the company‟s stock for each year from 2008 to 2010. IND1 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the industry is goods; otherwise it is equal to “0”. 
IND2 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the industry is property or otherwise equal to “0”. IND3 is the dummy variable equal to “1” if the industry is service; otherwise equal to “0”. IND4 is the dummy variable 
equal to “1” if the industry is investment; otherwise it is equal to “0”.  
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed 
 IOWN BOWN LOWN BDS NED DIVERS ACOM RCOM LEV DIV2TA Log(TA) 
FM 
RISK 
IOWN -            
BOWN 
0.0104 
(0.518 
- 
 
         
LOWN 
0.052 
(0.747) 
0.315** 
(0.045) 
- 
         
BDS 
-0.282* 
(0.074) 
-0.153 
(0.340) 
-0.425** 
(0.006) 
-         
NED 
0.265* 
(0.094) 
-0.196 
(0.220) 
-0.071 
(0.661) 
-0.170 
(0.287) 
-        
DIVERS 
-0.160 
(0.316) 
-0.084 
(0.600) 
-0.231 
(0.147) 
0.529*** 
(0.000) 
-0.132 
(0.412) 
-       
ACOM 
0.019 
(0.905) 
-0.181 
(0.258) 
-0.032 
(0.844) 
0.103 
(0.521) 
0.209 
(0.190) 
0.203 
(0.203) 
-      
RCOM 
-0.019 
(0.905) 
0.181 
(0.278) 
0.032 
(0.844) 
-0.103 
(0.521) 
-0.209 
(0.190) 
-0.203 
(0.207) 
-0.019 
(0.309) 
-     
LEV 
0.305* 
(0.053) 
0.017 
(0.914) 
-0.032 
(0.842) 
0.202 
(0.206) 
0.005 
(0.974) 
-0.026 
(0.872) 
0.147 
(0.360) 
-0.147 
(0.360) 
-    
DIV2TA 
-0.253 
(0.111) 
0.112 
(0.485) 
-0.076 
(0.637) 
0.079 
(0.626) 
-0.208 
(0.192) 
0.246 
(0.121) 
-0.166 
(0.301) 
0.166 
(0.301) 
-0.122 
(0.448) 
-   
Log(TA) 
-0.251 
(0.113) 
0.103 
(0.522) 
0.001 
(0.993) 
0.569*** 
(0.000) 
-0.179 
(0.2630 
0.225 
(0.158) 
0.084 
(0.600) 
-0.084 
(0.600) 
0.370** 
(0.017) 
0.085 
(0.598) 
-  
FM 
RISK 
0.012 
(0.941) 
0.097 
(0.547) 
-0.078 
(0.626) 
-0.033 
(0.836) 
-0.046 
(0.775) 
-0.132 
(0.410) 
-0.402** 
(0.009) 
0.402** 
(0.009) 
-0.156 
(0.331) 
-0.093 
(0.564) 
-0.236 
(0.139) 
- 
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Table 4: OLS Regression of Tobin’s Q, MB and ROA on Governance and Control 
variables 
 
Equation 1 
Independent 
Variable 
Q ROA ROE 
EBITDA2REV 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
error after 
adjusted for 
clustering 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error after 
adjusted for 
clustering 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error after 
adjusted for 
clustering 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error after 
adjusted for 
clustering 
Constant -2.91++ 
(-2.85) 
1.38 0.66 
(0.93 
0.71 -1.14 
(-0.64) 
1.78 0.34 
(0.27) 
1.25 
IOWN -0.046** 
(-2.15) 
0.32 -0.44*** 
(-4.81) 
0.09 -0.88*** 
(-3.84) 
0.23 -0.45** 
(-2.78) 
0.16 
LOWN -1.48** 
(-2.64) 
0.40 -0.08 
(-0.56) 
0.14 -0.07 
(-0.22) 
0.34 -0.12 
(-0.50) 
0.24 
BOWN 0.28 
(0.45) 
0.32 -0.32* 
(-1.75) 
0.19 0.01 
(0.02 
0.47 -0.24 
(-0.76) 
0.33 
BDS 0.54 
(0.58) 
1.33 -0.57** 
(-2.02) 
0.28 -0.50* 
(-1.89) 
0.71 -0.96* 
(-1.95) 
0.49 
NED -0.03 
(-0.04) 
0.42 -0.30 
(-1.38) 
0.22 -0.28 
(-0.52) 
0.55 -0.12 
(-0.30) 
0.38 
DIVERS -1.18 
-0.83) 
1.57 -0.14 
(-0.27) 
0.54 -0.55 
(-0.59) 
1.35 0.71 
(0.76) 
0.94 
ACOM 4.15++ 
(2.65) 
0.95 -0.18 
(-0.30) 
0.61 1.73 
(1.14) 
1.53 0.41 
(0.38) 
1.07 
RCOM 4.08++ 
(2.45) 
0.97 -0.25 
(-0.41) 
0.61 1.98 
(1.29) 
1.54 0.40 
(0.37) 
1.07 
LEV 0.52 
(1.52) 
0.26 0.77*** 
(7.51) 
0.10 1.75*** 
(6.79) 
0.26 0.66*** 
(3.62) 
0.18 
DIV2TA 3.80++ 
(2.26) 
2.30 2.33*** 
(3.53) 
0.66 1.16*** 
(3.80) 
0.75 1.93 
(1.66) 
1.17 
Ln(REV) -0.12++ 
(-2.15) 
0.04 0.06*** 
(3.44) 
0.66 0.08* 
(1.82) 
0.04 0.06** 
(3.16) 
0.03 
FMRISK -0.01 
(-0.06) 
.15 0.06 
(0.88) 
0.07 -0.13 
(-0.76) 
0.18 0.01 
(0.09) 
0.12 
Dep2TA -4.03 
(-1.30) 
1.36 -1.53 
(-1.66) 
0.93 3.12 
(1.33) 
2.34 -0.38 
(-0.24) 
1.63 
Int2TA 3.03++ 
(1.22) 
1.68 0.08 
(0.17) 
0.46 0.92 
(0.79) 
1.16 0.35 
(0.43) 
0.81 
RGDP -0.03 
(-0.50) 
0.20 -0.01 
(-0.28) 
0.02 0.06 
(1.24) 
0.05 -0.01 
(-0.15) 
0.03 
Industry 
Dummy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F Statistics 
(p value) 
3.39** 
(0.003) 
 6.57*** 
(0.000) 
 3.66*** 
(0.001) 
 2.59** 
(0.016) 
 
R2 
 (Adj. R2) 
0.74 
(0.52) 
 0.85 
(0.72) 
 0.75 
(0.56) 
 0.68 
(0.42) 
 
N 43  43  43    
***Significance at the 0.001 level (2-tailed), ++ Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), † Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5: OLS Regression of Tobin’s Q, MB and ROA on Ownership, Governance  and 
Control variables 
 
Equation 2 
Independent 
Variable 
Q ROA ROE EBITDA2REV 
 Coefficient 
Standard error 
after adjusted 
for clustering 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
after adjusted 
for clustering 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
after adjusted 
for clustering 
Coefficient 
Standard 
error after 
adjusted for 
clustering 
Constant 
-4.00* 
(-1.79) 
2.23 
1.22** 
(2.12) 
0.58 
0.73 
(0.97) 
0.76 
0.55 
(0.42) 
1.32 
IOWN 
0.74 
(1.49) 
0.49 
0.32*** 
(2.48) 
0.13 
0.41** 
(2.44) 
0.17 
0.36 
(1.22) 
0.29 
Less20 
0.60 
(1.40) 
0.43 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
0.11 
-0.05 
(-0.36) 
0.15 
-0.15 
(-0.57) 
0.26 
Over20 
-0.11 
(-0.22) 
0.48 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.13 
-0.02 
(-0.12) 
0.16 
-0.05 
(-0.18) 
02.9 
LOWN 
-1.13** 
(-2.67) 
0.42 
-0.04 
(-0.45) 
0.11 
-0.07 
(-1.31) 
0.05 
-0.12 
(-0.82) 
0.34 
BOWN 
-0.44* 
(-2.69) 
0.58 
-0.21 
(-1.39) 
0.15 
-0.34* 
(-1.75) 
0.20) 
-0.27 
(-0.820 
0.34 
BDS 
0.67 
(0.78) 
0.86 
-0.31 
(-1.40) 
0.22 
-0.57* 
(-1.96) 
0.29 
-0.99* 
(-1.93) 
0.51 
NED 
0.28 
(0.41) 
0.68 
-0.22 
(-1.25) 
0.0.18 
-0.32 
(-1.38) 
0.23 
-0.17 
(-0.42) 
0.40 
DIVERS 
-2.04 
(-1.23) 
1.67 
-0.15 
(-0.35) 
0.43 
-0.11 
(-0.21) 
0.57 
0.78 
(0.79) 
0.99 
ACOM 
4.76** 
(2.53) 
1.87 
-0.26 
(-0.55) 
0.48 
-0.21 
(-0.34) 
0.64 
0.31 
(0.28) 
1.11 
RCOM 
4.84** 
(2.56) 
1.89 
-0.33 
(-0.67) 
0.49 
-0.29 
(-0.45) 
0.64 
0.28 
(0.25) 
1.13 
LEV 
0.58* 
(1.83) 
0.32 
-0.61*** 
(-7.42) 
0.08 
-0.77*** 
(-7.17) 
0.11 
-0.66** 
(-3.50) 
0.18 
DIV2TA 
5.32** 
(2.13) 
2.13 
1.31** 
(2.36) 
0.55 
2.26** 
(3.12) 
0.72 
1.72 
(1.36) 
1.27 
Ln(REV) 
-0.15** 
(-2.79) 
0.22 
0.04** 
(3.07) 
0.01 
0.06** 
(3.31) 
0.02 
0.10** 
(3.13) 
0.03 
FMRISK 
-0.60 
-0.27) 
0.22 
0.05 
(0.78) 
0.06 
0.07 
(0.92) 
0.08 
0.03 
(0.26) 
0.13 
Dep2TA 
-2.93 
(-1.02) 
2.89 
-1.22 
(-1.63) 
0.75 
-1.56 
(-1.63) 
0.98 
-0.55 
(-0.32) 
1.71 
Int2TA 
3.05** 
(2.46) 
1.43 
-0.04 
(-0.11) 
0.37 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.48 
0.28 
(0.33) 
0.84 
RGDP 
-0.19 
(-0.32) 
0.06 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
0.02 
-0.07 
(-0.33) 
0.02 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
0.04 
Industry 
Dummy 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F Statistics 
(p value) 
3.89*** 
(0.001) 
 
5.01*** 
(0.000) 
 
5.49*** 
(0.000) 
 
2.21** 
(0.038) 
 
R2 
(Adj. R2) 
0.80 
(0.59) 
 
0.83 
(0.67) 
 
0.85 
(0.69) 
 
0.69 
(0.38) 
 
N 43  43  43  43  
***Significance at the 0.001 level (2-tailed), ++ Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), † Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
